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Abstract The Snow White problem is introduced to demonstrate how learning some-
thing of which one could not have learnt the opposite (due to observer selection bias)
can change an agent’s probability assignment. This helps us to analyse the Sleeping
Beauty problem, which is deconstructed as a combinatorial engine and a subjective
wrapper. The combinatorial engine of the problem is analogous to Bertrand’s boxes
paradox and can be solved with standard probability theory. The subjective wrap-
per is clarified using the Snow White problem. Sample spaces for all three problems
are presented. The conclusion is that subjectivity plays no irreducible role in solving
the Sleeping Beauty problem and that no reference to centered worlds is required to
provide the answer.
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Sleeping Beauty problem
Two paradoxes are better than one; they may even suggest a solution.
– Edward Teller (Teller et al. 2002, p. 135)
1 The Snow White problem
Let me present a new problem, inspired by the Sleeping Beauty problem (Elga 2000)
and intended to clarify the latter.
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The Snow White problem
Snow White (SW) is about to meet the witch (W), who will offer her an apple.
Before they meet, W will toss a fair coin: if it lands heads, she will offer SW a
poisoned apple, which will kill her instantly; if the coin lands tails, W will offer
SW an enchanted apple, which will make everyone live happily ever after. The
huntsman has warned SW of W’s plan, but she decides that she will accept and
eat the apple anyway, putting her life at risk in the hope of an enchantment.
Now assume that SW has just finished eating the apple offered to her by W. She
finds herself to be alive. Which degree of belief should she now rationally assign
to the possibility that the coin toss has produced heads?
The answer is zero. SW is certain that the coin has not landed heads, for else, she
would be dead by now.1
It may seem as though there is also a case to be made for the answer 1/2. Indeed,
there is a fair coin involved, which has an equal prior probability of landing heads:
P(H) = P(¬H) = 1
2
,
where H refers to the event that the coin lands heads and ¬H to the event that the coin
lands tails.2
On the other hand, there is additional information in the story, which requires us
to consider a conditional probability. The crucial information, which will function as
the conditioning event, is that SW has survived eating the apple. So, the answer to the
puzzle can be found via this conditional probability:
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where A refers to the event that SW receives and eats W’s apple and L refers to the
event that SW lives.
Since SW learns that she has survived eating the apple (and nothing more), the
above conditioning event is in agreement with her current information. Therefore, it
is rational for her to align her degree of belief (or ‘credence’) with this conditional
probability.
Of course, SW may describe the conditioning event as “I am alive”, something
which rarely counts as new information that is relevant to update one’s degrees of
belief upon. However, the whole set-up of the story clearly requires us to do so for
this problem.
Although it may appear otherwise, solving this puzzle does not teach us anything
essential about the interplay between (subjective) probability and de se beliefs. After
1 This problem is so trivial that it barely deserves the name. It involves a biconditional and elementary
logic suffices to find the answer. Yet, I will apply probability theory to it to clarify the subjective aspect of
the Sleeping Beauty problem.
2 Events will be represented as sets throughout.
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all, it does not matter who determines the conditional probability, as long as the
modelling agent has exactly the same information as SW has at the time of interest.
SW can do this herself, but also the huntsman, who has not witnessed the coin toss,
can deduce that the coin must have landed tails (with P = 1) when he observes SW
eating the apple and surviving it.
Moreover, SW can calculate the above conditional probability at any time, but since
the conditioning event does not apply to her before she has eaten the apple, it is not
rational to align her degrees of belief with it prior to meeting W. All the relevant
information she possesses before eating the apple is that W uses a fair coin. So, at that
point in time it is rational for SW to keep her degree of belief aligned with the prior
probability, 1/2.
Unlike SW, the huntsman may also observe SW’s death after eating the apple,
in which case he can deduce that the coin must have landed heads. The relevant
conditional probability is:
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Before the coin toss, SW can compute this conditional probability, too. The main
difference between her and the huntsman is that SW can never be in a situation such
that she has to align her degrees of belief with this conditional event. In this limited
sense, the problem exhibits a form of observation selection bias. However, this does
not affect the degree of belief that the puzzle asks for.
Still, we may suspect that a contradiction is lurking right beneath the surface.
Given that SW knows beforehand that, once given the opportunity, she will lower her
degree of belief in heads after eating the apple from 1/2 to 0, shouldn’t she do so
already? If the answer is ‘yes’, this contradicts the assumption of a fair coin. Should
we now argue that SW’s degree of belief ought to stay 1/2 after all, in order to avoid
this contradiction? The answer is ‘no’ to both questions: SW should not revise her
degrees of belief beforehand, for she has not been given any evidence yet. If she is in
a position to revise her degrees of belief afterwards, then she learns that the apple was
not poisonous, which only occurs if the coin landed tails. There is no contradiction,
not even an implicit one.
Weisberg (2005) considers a similar example of a firing squad, due to Leslie, in
which the prior probability of survival is much smaller than 1/2. He argues that the
fact that one cannot observe one’s own non-survival does not constitute a full-blown
observation selection effect, but merely a conditional: “If I observe whether I survive,
I will observe that I survive” (p. 816). This applies to the Snow White problem, too: if
SW survives, then she observes that she survives. Weisberg also observes the essential
agreement between a first- and third-person perspective in this case. He further brings
this to bear on the weak anthropic principle and the issue of cosmological fine-tuning,
which I will not go into here.
At this point, I hope that the reader has been convinced that learning something
of which one could not have learnt the opposite—not because it could not have been
otherwise, but because of the aforementioned (conditional) selection bias—can lower
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Fig. 1 Venn diagram representing a sample space () for analysing the Snow White problem, with three
partitions of it: {A, ¬A}, {H, ¬H}, and {L, ¬L}. The areas of intersections suggest probability measures
of various events. It can immediately be seen that P(¬ H | A ⋂ L) = 1
one’s posterior probability assignment to a fair coin having landed heads (even to
zero).
1.1 Sample space for the Snow White problem
Probabilities are assigned to events, which are subsets of a sample space. It is straight-
forward to present a sample space for the Snow White problem. The symbols for
events, which have already been introduced, correspond to members of partitions of
this sample space. While the events can be described using tensed statements, index-
icals, and demonstratives by specific agents in particular contexts, referring to them
by the symbols is always possible.
As can be seen in Fig. 1, the sample space () can be partitioned in at least three ways:
(1) {A, ¬A}, representing whether or not SW receives and eats W’s apple,
(2) {H, ¬H}, representing whether or not the coin toss lands heads, and
(3) {L, ¬L}, representing whether or not SW is alive.
Most of the time, SW does not receive any potentially poisoned apple from W (¬A;
righthand-side of  in Fig. 1), and her being alive is independent from coin toss results.
(Since SW is fictional, we may assume her probability of dying to be zero when she
receives no apple from W.)
In this simple case, the event ¬L (“SW is dead”) is equivalent to H ⋂ A (“The coin
lands heads & SW receives and eats W’s apple”), but in general, sets from various
partitions may intersect in different ways. In addition, despite the two-dimensional
representation, the sample space is best thought of as a high-dimensional set, which
may include spacetime coordinates as variables.
1.2 Analogy between SW and SB
For self-containedness, I now give a rephrasing of the Sleeping Beauty problem.
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Sleeping Beauty and a wicked fairy
Sleeping Beauty (SB) is about to be put under a sleeping spell by a wicked fairy
(WF). SB will sleep for a long time during which WF will wake her up either for
one or for two brief periods. As soon as SB sleeps, WF will toss a fair coin: if
it lands heads, WF will wake SB once; if it lands tails, WF will wake SB twice.
After each waking period, WF administers a poison to SB, such that SB will not
remember that she has been awake. SB is informed of all these things before she
is put to sleep.
Now assume that SB has just been awoken by WF. SB does not receive any clues
from which she could deduce whether this is the first or the second awakening.
Which degree of belief should she now rationally assign to the possibility that
the coin toss has produced heads?
Let us start by elucidating two analogies between this scenario and the SW problem.
First, the fact that one is conscious (SW still alive; SB currently awake) rarely counts
as a relevant piece of information when evaluating probabilities. Nevertheless, the
contrived set-up of both stories requires us to do so for these puzzles. Second, the
fact that one cannot observe oneself to be unconscious (SW dead; SB asleep) is not
essential for calculating the relevant probabilities, nor is the fact that the subjects in
these puzzles have to evaluate information pertaining to themselves. To illustrate this,
we may introduce an observer, who has the same information as the subjects: since we
introduced the huntsman for the Snow White problem, let us consider the prince for
the Sleeping Beauty problem. Suppose that the prince receives a picture of SB taken at
a random time during the sleeping spell: if he happens to see SB awake, he may lower
his probability of the coin having landed heads to 1/3—as should SB herself when she
finds herself to be awake during the procedure. Of course, it is far more likely that the
prince will see a picture in which SB is asleep, in which case he can raise his degree of
belief in the coin having landed heads slightly above 1/2. (The exact amount depends
on how long a waking episode lasts as compared to the total duration of the spell.)
This shows that the first-person aspect in the Sleeping Beauty is ‘transparent’, in the
sense that the relevant events can be described by third-person propositions, without
altering the relevant conditional probability. The set-up of WF’s spell is such that SB
is maximally uncertain about what time it is when she finds herself awake during the
spell. Roughly, the evidence that she thereby receives—and that only SB can gloss as
“I am awake now”—is equivalent to: “at a randomly sampled moment during WF’s
spell, SB is awake”. However, this mixes an event and its probability; see Sect. 4 for
a more precise treatment that disentangles these aspects.
There is, of course, an important dissimilarity between the Sleeping Beauty problem
and the Snow White problem: whereas SB can take it for granted that she will wake
up at least once, SW cannot be sure that she will survive. This makes the case for 1/2
weaker in the Sleeping Beauty problem than in the Snow White problem. To overcome
this disanalogy, I now discuss the combinatoric engine of the Sleeping Beauty problem
separately.
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2 Bertrand’s boxes paradox
Let us first verify that the answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem is indeed 1/3, as
originally claimed (Elga 2000). To this aim, I invoke an analogy—with an adapted form
of Bertrand’s boxes paradox (Bertrand 1889).3 This analogy has also been observed
by (Rosenthal 2009), although he admits that it needs “some sort of reformulation or
philosophical analysis” (p. 36), before the relevant conditional probabilities can be
brought to bear on the SB case. Such an analysis is precisely what I aim to offer here.
Although Bertrand presented his boxes puzzle as a paradox of probability,4 con-
temporary mathematicians view the problem as one with a unique and indisputable
answer.5
Variation on Bertrand’s boxes problem
Bertrand (B) is about to meet Joseph (J), who will carry a box that contains one
thousand medals. Before they meet, J will toss a fair coin: if it lands heads, J
will take a box that contains 1 gold medal and 999 silver medals; if it lands tails,
J will take a box that contains 2 gold medals and 998 silver ones. When they
meet, B has to pick a medal from the box without looking into it.
Now assume that B has just picked a medal from the box that J carried and it
turns out to be a gold medal. What is the probability that the coin has produced
heads?
The answer is 1/3.
A correct way of reasoning is as follows. Initially, each of the 2000 medals has the
same probability of being selected (this equiprobability is due to the combination of
J’s use of a fair coin and B’s selection of a medal without looking). We are asked to
assume that the first medal is a golden one, which occurs in three out of these 2000
cases. Of these three ways to select a gold medal (which are all equally likely), the
medal comes from the box containing just one gold medal in one out of three cases. So,
the probability that the selected medal comes from the box containing a gold medal
and 999 silver ones is 1/3. J carries this box only if the coin landed heads. Hence, the
probability that the coin landed heads is also 1/3.6
It may seem as though there is also a case to made for the answer 1/2: after
all, J uses a fair coin and both boxes contain at least one gold medal. However,
3 Bertrand’s paradoxes are well-known in the contemporary literature as illustrations of the difficulty in
applying the principle of indifference. Bertrand’s boxes problem is a particularly simple example, appearing
early in the first chapter—even before the famous chord problem—involving three boxes each containing
two medals (either both silver, both gold, or one of each). It is not to be confused with the ‘boxes factory’,
which is a more recent paradox (also related to indifference) due to van Fraassen.
4 A similar problem, which asks for the probability of obtaining at least one heads in two consecutive
tosses with a fair coin, even got the famous mathematician d’Alembert fooled (see, e.g., Henry 2005).
5 Illustrative is the fact that the boxes problem served as a template for a question in the Dutch national
science quiz of 2011, which is organized by the Netherlands Scientific Research Organization as a popu-
larization effort for mathematics and science (NWQ 2011).
6 Observe that the solution does not depend on the fact that the boxes each contain a thousand medals;
what does matter is that both boxes contain an equal number of at least two medals, exactly one versus two
of which are gold.
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Fig. 2 Venn diagram representing a sample space () for analysing the variant of Bertrand’s boxes problem,
with 200 medals rather than 2000, with two partitions of it: {H, ¬H} and {G, ¬G}. The circles indicate
atomic events, which are all equiprobable. It can immediately be seen that P (H | G) = 1/3
the probability that the medal comes from the box containing two gold medals is
twice as large as the probability that it comes from the box containing only one gold
medal.7
2.1 Sample space for Bertrand’s boxes problem
The above claims can be checked with the sample space given in Fig. 2, albeit for
200 medals rather than 2000. H and ¬H stand for the events that the coin lands heads
or tails, respectively. G and ¬G stand for the events that a gold or silver medal are
selected, respectively.
2.2 Analogy between B and SB
Let us now explore the analogy between the boxes problem and the Sleeping Beauty
problem. Obviously, the gold medals are intended to correspond to “SB is awake” and
the silver medals to “SB is asleep”. The fact that each box contains a gold medal does
not alter the fact that B’s drawing one ought to change the degree of belief that we
assign to the coin having landed heads. Likewise, the fact that SB knows that she will
be awake at least once during the sleeping spell, does not alter the fact that finding
herself to be awake ought to change her degree of beliefs.8
7 Observe that if one box contains two medals and the other just one (and nothing else), and all three are
gold, nothing can be learnt from picking out a single gold medal: the conditional probability of the coin
having landed heads remains equal to the unconditional value, 1/2. This situation is not structurally similar
to the original one—although thinking so is a common mistake (cf. footnote 4). Crucially, also the Sleeping
Beauty problem does not have this structure, as will be demonstrated below.
8 If you are bothered by the fact that SB is guaranteed to be awake at least once, whereas drawing a gold
medal is not at all, see the Wicked Joseph scenario below.
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To make the analogy more explicit, we can model the Sleeping Beauty problem as
follows. Let us assume that the duration of one waking period lasts 1/1000 of the total
duration of the spell.9 Then the probabilities in the Sleeping Beauty problem are:10
P(H) = P(¬H) = 1
2
,
P(W) = 3
2000
,
P(¬W) = 1997
2000
,
( ) ( )( ) .3
1
=
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=
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where W stands for SB is awake and ¬W for SB is asleep.11
Since SB learns that she is awake during the spell (and nothing more), it is rational
for her to align her degree of belief in the coin having landed heads with the conditional
probability P(H|W), which does not depend on any assumption concerning the duration
of the waking periods. So, 1/3 is the answer to the puzzle.
Although it is not required for solving the puzzle, it is helpful for the further discussion
also to compute the following conditional probability:
( ) ( )( ) .2
1
1997
999
>=
¬
¬∩
=¬
WP
WHP
WHP
2.3 Lucid beauty
It might be objected that the above reconstruction of the puzzle, in which SB is awake
a specified (albeit arbitrary) fraction of time, is crucially different from the original
puzzle. After all, the awakenings need not be equally long. It is true that the model
introduces some superfluous structure, but it is only there to simplify the demonstra-
tion; the solution does not depend on it.12
9 The value of the denominator is set to 1000 for definiteness only; it will become clear that nothing
hinges on this choice. Any denominator larger than or equal to two is fine (to allow for two awakenings in
the duration of the spell). This independence is similar as before (cf. footnote 6). The crucial part is that
the denominators are equal (cf. footnote 9), which is motivated by the fact that the spell’s total duration is
independent of the coin toss.
10 Of course, SB may describe the conditioning event as “I am awake”. This makes no essential difference,
as was argued in Sect. 1.2 on the Snow White problem.
11 The glosses “SB is awake” for W and “SB is asleep” for ¬W are shorthand and are supposed to include
background information such as “SB is under WF’s spell” (Sect. 4.1), which, crucially, also encodes how
the moment is sampled (Sect. 4.2).
12 A more complicated version takes into account all possible durations and a higher-order probability
function over them. Yet, the overall solution averages out to the one presented in the ‘symmetric’ case (in
which all awakenings have equal duration).
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Moreover, even if you reject the previous model, the main point can be demonstrated
without it. Suppose that SB was a lucid dreamer, occasionally able to observe herself
asleep (without memory of earlier lucid or waking moments during the spell): during
such a lucid episode, she would have to assign a probability of more than 1/2 to the
coin having landed heads. This probability can be has high as 1 (if SB is remains
awake for half of the spell upon each awakening), but if SB is only woken up briefly
(as stipulated by Elga 2000) it will be only slightly more than 1/2 (as is the case in
the numerical example above). Now the crucial observation: even if SB was a lucid
dreamer, she would have to assign a probability of strictly less than 1/2 to the coin
having landed heads when she found herself to be awake. (It does require a numerical
model to demonstrate that it is exactly 1/3.) In the original version, where Sleeping
Beauty does not have the ability of lucid dreaming, finding herself not asleep is like
hearing the dog that didn’t bark in the night: it is hard to notice, but once learnt, it
solves the puzzle.
2.4 Wicked Joseph
I already argued that the fact that SB cannot witness herself asleep does not alter the
fact that she receives new evidence from being awake. This point can also be illustrated
by tinkering further with the boxes problem. Suppose that J is an evil wizard, whose
boxes contain a poisonous gas, which renders bystanders unconscious and erases their
memory of the previous minutes. If B happens to pick a silver medal, the gas is released
immediately; if he picks a gold medal, the release of the gas is delayed. Only when he
picks a gold medal, he will be able to realize (briefly) which metal he has picked; in
all cases, he forgets it afterwards. Also, assume that J lets B continue picking medals
until the box is empty and that B cannot tell whether it is the first, the second, … or the
thousandth medal he is about to pick. If B knows in advance that there will be thousand
drawings and that he will only be conscious after having drawn a gold medal, then he
also knows that he will experience drawing one gold medal at least once in any case.
None of these alterations to the boxes problem influence the relevant conditional
probability. So, B’s degree of belief that the coin landed heads still ought to drop from
1/2 to 1/3 as soon as he does pick a gold medal. Likewise, SB’s degree of belief should
change as soon as she wakes up during the procedure.13
For the Snow White problem, it was discussed why SW should not update before
eating W’s apple. While SW does not know that she will be able to receive any evidence,
both SB and B do know in advance that they will receive evidence at least once and
what the content of this first piece of evidence will be. For B, this piece of evidence can
be described as “a randomly sampled coin in the wicked Joseph set-up is golden”. Still,
the learning only occurs when they find themselves conscious during the procedure.
If SB is in a position to revise, then she learns that she is awake at a randomly sampled
moment during WF’s spell, which is twice as probable on heads than on tails. Similarly
for B. (See Sects. 3.2 and 4 for further discussion of these points.)
13 Since I argue that something is learnt in both cases, van Fraassen’s reflection principle (1984) does not
apply to either scenario.
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3 Indexicals and demonstratives versus intra-model labels
At this point, let me make explicit the purpose of the previous two sections. There
have been two main types of responses to the Sleeping Beauty problem:14 type (1)
responses state that SB learns nothing new by waking up and hence it is irrational
to update her degrees of belief; type (2) responses state that we need to add some-
thing (namely, centered worlds and update rules for them, as explained below) to the
Bayesian formalism to capture the propositional content of self-locating beliefs. The
arguments in my paper are intended to reply to both.
Replies to (1) are not new. Weintraub (2004) was the first to argue that SB does
learn new evidence upon awaking during the spell, namely that she is awake now. I
think this reply was on the right track, but I want to make crystal-clear how this can be
relevant evidence. In particular, I presented the Snow White problem to answer to (1)
and Bertrand’s boxes problem to answer to (2); the Lucid Beauty and Wicked Joseph
variants add to my reply to (1).
In this section, I will elaborate on my reply to (2) and add to Weintraub’s reply to (1)
that the evidence need not be in indexical or demonstrative form—thereby connecting
the replies to (1) and (2).
3.1 Centered worlds
There may be readers who find my approach so obvious,15 that they wonder why
anyone would reject it. So, let me first try to explain why some philosophers indeed
reject it,16 before replying to them.
The Sleeping Beauty problem was intended as a puzzle about self-locating beliefs,
anthropic reasoning, and subjective probabilities: this is clear from the context in which
Zuboff started thinking about it (Zuboff 1990; as recounted in: Zuboff 2009). Initiated
by the publication of Elga (2000), the problem has generated a large and interesting
body of literature that continues to focus on these aspects. Philosophers have many
reasons to care about the Sleeping Beauty problem (see, e.g., Titelbaum 2013 for an
overview). From a mathematical point of view, however, the mechanism for solving the
Sleeping Beauty problem does not require any additional rules for updating degrees
of self-locating beliefs. It will be shown that there is a lossless translation from first-
person to third-person statements and that an outsider with identical information will
arrive at the same conclusions.
The combinatorial engine I presented may be regarded as crucially different from
the original Sleeping Beauty puzzle, because it replaces uncertainty about centered
worlds by uncertainty about which possible world obtains. See for instance (Meacham
2008, p. 249) for a brief description of the distinction between de dicto and de se
propositions, originally due to Lewis (1979). Whereas de dicto propositions describe
what the world is like (modelled by ‘possible worlds’), de se propositions describe
14 For a recent, brief overview of the vast literature on the Sleeping Beauty problem, see Winkler (2017).
15 For instance, a mathematician like Rosenthal (2009) might.
16 For instance, I suspect Meacham (2008) and Titelbaum (2013, 2014) would reject it.
123
Synthese
when or where the subject is in that world (modelled by ‘centered worlds’). When the
indexicals in de se propositions can be replaced by de dicto propositions, they are said
to be reducible. But many authors think that the replacement is not possible in cases
that involve agents that do not know who they are in the world or at which location or at
what time they find themselves: such scenarios seem to involve essential uncertainty
over centered worlds. In that case, the scenario is said to involve irreducibly de se
propositions, and when the probabilities about such propositions change that is called
an irreducibly de se belief change. Some of these scenarios involve passing of time and
changes of truth values of propositions over time. Moreover, many of these scenarios
involve forgetting, which cannot be modelled by Bayesian updating (that only takes
into account receiving additional information).
Elga (2000) and nearly all commentators adopted Lewis’s (1979) distinction and
agree that the puzzle involves irreducibly de se belief change. It then remains to be
discussed how such degrees of belief ought to be revised, since probability theory
is silent on this. This is precisely the reason why the Sleeping Beauty problem has
received so much attention in the literature: as a test case for demonstrating the vices
and virtues of proposed revisions.
I will follow Titelbaum’s (2014; Chapter 10) exposition of an extension of the
Bayesian framework intended to deal with updating on evidence that can con-
tain context-dependent, indexical information. Titelbaum calls his reconstruction the
‘HTM approach’, named after Halpern (2005), Tuttle, and Meacham (2008); Titel-
baum himself rejects it. On the HTM approach, updating degrees of belief becomes a
two-step procedure: new evidence is first used to redistribute one’s degrees of belief
over centered worlds, then over uncentered worlds. It is a hierarchical procedure in
the sense that the second step does not change the degrees of belief over centered
worlds that resulted from the first step. In addition, the HTM approach agrees with
a “relevance-limiting thesis” (Titelbaum 2014, p. 232): changes in centered evidence
(that only eliminate centered possible worlds) should not influence degrees of belief
assigned to uncentered possible worlds. Titelbaum explains that this proposed con-
straint only applies to scenarios in which agents track their evolving spatio-temporal
location in otherwise entirely predictable situations. He also conjectures that this prin-
ciple captures a central intuition motivating many other ‘halfers’ about the SB problem.
However, I reject that the Sleeping Beauty problem requires us to go beyond the
usual Bayesian approach to probability.17 I already gave the positive part of my argu-
ment above, demonstrating that the de se belief change in the Sleeping Beauty problem
is reducible by considering a third-person perspective or a lucid dreamer, allowing SB
to apply probability theory and Bayes’ rule to her situation directly.18
17 To be clear, there may be other ways to solve the Sleeping Beauty problem and it may be interesting
to consider the subjectivity in the Sleeping Beauty problem, but doing so is not necessary to solve it. Other
problems that involve subjective or temporal beliefs may need additional principles for belief change, such
as Bradley’s (2011b) mutation principle. The Sleeping Beauty problem, however, can be solved by the usual
Bayesian formalism alone.
18 Though I argued along different lines, the conclusion agrees with that of Bradley (2011a): learning
where we are in the world gives rise to essentially similar observation selection effects as learning what the
world is like by sampling from a population.
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My main point is that the information of centered worlds should not be sup-
plemented to the sample space, but should be read off from it using, possibly
incomplete, knowledge about who, where, and when a particular agent can pos-
sibly be. It is never necessary to conditionalize on statements with indexicals: the
sample space requires restricting on the corresponding possible identities, times, and
locations instead. This can be done equally well whether starting from a first- or third-
person perspective (although the information each modelling agent has can differ, of
course). If additional information from centered worlds seems necessary to represent
dynamics of de se beliefs, the sample space was simply not rich enough to begin
with.
I believe that the introduction of centered worlds (as something not reducible to the
sample space) is plausibly due to a misunderstanding of the term ‘possible worlds’
(and ‘sample space’) as used in probability theory: it means (the set of) all possibilities
relevant for the problem at hand, not just possible states of an external, observer-
independent world. (See also footnote 19.)
3.2 Main diagnosis of the confusion
Let me now give my diagnosis of the main source of confusion stirred up by the Sleep-
ing Beauty problem and similar puzzles. At any point in time, possible pieces of evi-
dence can be considered hypothetically and the relevant conditional probabilities can
be computed with Bayes’ theorem. It is only when the relevant agent actually receives
a piece of evidence, that the agent is supposed to update his or her degrees of belief by
applying Bayes’ rule. In this limited sense, receiving evidence and being in a position
to update according to Bayes’ rule has an irreducibly indexical aspect to it. By indexing
probability functions, the Bayesian formalism allows us to represent different agents
receiving different pieces of evidence and each agent accumulating evidence over time.
It does not follow that the evidence itself necessarily has an indexical aspect to it.
In the Sleeping Beauty scenario and related puzzles, these two aspects become
mixed: the agent that is supposed to be doing the Bayesian modelling (SB) is also
the subject of the probabilistic scenario she is being asked to model. It has widely
been assumed that the evidence SB receives is irreducibly de se (which is not
captured by the Bayesian formalism). However, my analysis demonstrates that the
only indexical aspect in the Sleeping Beauty scenario is that of the updating itself
(ever present in Bayesianism), which does not require any extension of the for-
malism. Until convincingly proven otherwise, we can continue to assume that the
Bayesian formalism is not in need of amendment with update rules for centered evi-
dence.
4 What has been forgotten so far
In this section, first I comment on a curious omission in the literature on the Sleeping
Beauty problem. Then I briefly comment on the role of forgetting in the problem.
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Fig. 3 Venn diagram representing a sample space () for analysing the Sleeping Beauty problem, with
three partitions of it. The areas of intersections suggest probability measures of various events. It can
immediately be seen that P(H |W ⋂ S) = 1/3
4.1 Sample space for the Sleeping Beauty problem
What is curiously absent from standard presentations and purported solutions of the
Sleeping Beauty puzzle is a sample space. I present one in Fig. 3. Similar to my
analysis of the Snow White problem, this sample space () can be partitioned in at
least three ways: (1) whether or not SB is under a spell by the WF, (2) whether or
not the coin toss landed heads, and (3) whether or not SB is asleep. Most of the time,
SW is not undergoing a spell by WF (¬S; righthand-side of  in the image), and her
being awake is independent from coin toss results. (The image suggests that SB is
awake for about 2/3 of the time when she’s not under a sleeping spell, but this value
is inconsequential.) When SW is undergoing WF’s spell, she sleeps most of the time,
and even a bit more if the coin landed heads.
The probabilities mentioned in Sect. 2.2 should be interpreted as already condition-
alized on S. In addition, Fig. 3 assumes that the duration of one waking period lasts
1/20 of the total duration of the spell, rather than 1/1000 as in Sect. 2.2.
Points of the sample space can be thought of as representing maximally specific
descriptions of ways the world could be like:19 this includes information on what time
it is (relative to each agent, if relativistic effects are relevant) and which agents are
alive and awake. The partitions coarse-grain this into certain contrasting cases, leaving
most details unspecified.
One crucial part of the structure of the Sleeping Beauty problem that this pic-
ture leaves out is a partition into time slices, each member of which contains an
element of H and an element of ¬H. The members of this partition that intersect
with S are equiprobable for a modeller with the same information as SB. This cor-
responds to random sampling and is crucial for the analogy with Bertrand’s boxes
problem.
19 It is here that the terminology of probability theory on the one hand and some branches of physics,
logic, and philosophy on the other may come apart. For example, in a probabilistic context, ‘the world’ may
refer to time slices of (part of) the physical universe—whatever is necessary to model the problem at hand.
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4.2 Lest we forget
The crux of the memory erasure in the Sleeping Beauty set-up20 is that it essentially
allows the agent to sample random moments from her own lifetime—something which
usually can be done only by another agent (e.g., by the prince looking at a randomly
picked picture). It is not the case that SB randomly samples moments at which she is
awake. Although it is admissible to consider a coarse-grained sample space that only
represents two possible outcomes (first or second awakening), this does not imply that
their probabilities are equal (so the sampling is not random). As was already argued
for by the analogy in Sect. 2, the probability associated with the possible waking
moments is in fact unequal: it is 2/3 for the first moment versus 1/3 for a second
one. Put differently, the relevant evidence SB receives is equivalent to that of a prince
receiving a picture taken randomly during the spell, in which it so happens that SB
is awake, not to that of a prince receiving a picture taken randomly during a moment
when SB is awake. Starting from the full sample space in Fig. 3 is helpful to avoid
reasoning by this false analogy (cf. footnote 7), which leads to the erroneous answer
of 1/2 in both Bertrand’s boxes problem and the Sleeping Beauty problem.
Observe that solving the Sleeping Beauty problem does not require us to model
SB’s belief change from before the spell has taken effect to a moment where it has.
Elga (2000) and other authors have emphasized that her degree of belief in a fair coin
flip resulting heads has to change from one waking moment (right before she’s put to
sleep) to the next (upon awakening during the spell).21 Yet, all that is being asked is
to model her rational degrees of belief at an awakening during the spell and I have
argued that this is structurally analogous to Bertrand’s boxes problem. Nevertheless,
the puzzle does invite further questions along these lines.
Visualizing the sample space helps us to tease apart which aspects of the Sleeping
Beauty problem can or cannot be modelled in an orthodox Bayesian way:
– There is no forgetting involved from just before the sleeping spell till the first
waking episode during the spell. It simply ceases to be a moment ‘before’, but it is
now a moment ‘during’ WF’s sleeping spell; this means it is no longer a possible
world from ¬S (righthand-side of the sample space in Fig. 3), but rather from S
(lefthand-side; cf. footnotes 12–14). Although SB does not know that it is the first
awakening, an orthodox Bayesian can model it as a normal update.
– There is forgetting involved from the first till the second waking episode (if there
is one). Effectively, what this amnesia does is to allow SB to randomly sample
waking episodes of her own life time and us to model it in analogy with Bertrand’s
boxes problem, which can be analysed using Bayes’ theorem. It is true that this
cannot be modelled by an orthodox Bayesian, who takes evidence to be strictly
cumulative.
20 The comments in this section also apply, mutatis mutandis, to B in the Wicked Joseph variant.
21 In addition, it is often claimed that this involves forgetting, but this seems wrong: SB does neither
forget it is Sunday (rather, it simply ceases to be Sunday, cf. Bradley (2011a, b) mutation principle), nor the
outcome of the toss (which she was not allowed to see in the first place), nor any details of the procedure
(which are crucial for her to know).
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– Similarly, there is forgetting from the last waking episode till after the procedure,
such that SB doesn’t remember how often she has been awake. In addition, it
ceases to be ‘during’, such that the rational degree of belief she should assign to
the coin having landed heads is 1/2 (¬S; righthand-side of the sample space in
Fig. 3).
So, two things happen simultaneously:
– Time passes and the spell is activated.
– SB is awake.
SB learns these two things (nearly) simultaneously, but the order doesn’t matter.
Because the spell is activated, she is maximally uncertain about the time (within
S). The rational thing to do, looking at the sample space of Fig. 3 is to restrict to the
-shaped part on the lefthand-side: the intersection W
⋂
S. This can be made palpable
to an orthodox Bayesian by observing that each moment in time is a new one, of which
usually little is known in advance. It is because something is known in advance (that
WF will cast the spell and how it affects SB’s awakenings) that probability theory can
be applied to it. Probability depends both on our ignorance and on our knowledge, as
Laplace already knew.
5 Boxing up the subjectivity in the Sleeping Beauty problem
Winkler (2017, p. 581) gauges the ‘thirder’ view to be the dominant position regarding
the Sleeping Beauty problem, although various minority positions may collectively
generate more publications. In mathematics, it can still be interesting to develop a new
proof for a well-known theorem. Likewise, in philosophy it is worthwhile to shorten,
to clarify, or to optimize otherwise the arguments for a widely shared position. This
is exactly what I aimed to do in this paper: to strengthen the defence of the thirder
position.
In summary, I have deconstructed the Sleeping Beauty problem into a combinatorial
engine and a subjective wrapper. I found the combinatorial engine of the problem
to be analogous to Bertrand’s boxes paradox, which is solved in terms of standard
probability. This core is wrapped in a story asking us to determine a rational degree of
belief of a subject, who is in a situation in which her being conscious co-depends on
the outcome of a toss with a fair coin. I offered the Snow White problem as a means
to see through this outer layer of the Sleeping Beauty problem, independent of its
combinatorial core. This shows that subjectivity plays no essential or irreducible role
in solving the Sleeping Beauty problem.
The phrasing in terms of subjective probabilities turns out to be merely superficial:
the relevant rational degree of belief can be equated with a conditional probability
(computable by the usual calculus); it is the latter that does all the work. Since agents
cannot observe themselves to be unconscious, subjectivity does introduce a form of
selection bias, but it turns out that the probability of interest does not crucially depend
on it in this puzzle.
The only way in which subjectivity affects the outcome is that different agents
in the story may have different pieces of information: the conditional probabilities
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that are relevant to their current situation may have different conditioning events. For
instance, the Wicked Fairy knows the outcome of the coin toss, so the probability that
she assigns to it having landed heads will be either 0 or 1. But this does not require
any new formalism.
It was my aim to solve the Sleeping Beauty problem with the simplest formalism
possible, separating the purely combinatorial core from the subjective aspects. An
important general lesson is that the sample space has to be made explicit and it is has
to be checked that its structure is rich enough for the problem at hand, such that no
information has to be added in the form of centered worlds.
Finally, I hope that my analysis of this toy problem can shed some light on more
pressing questions pertaining to observer selection effects, for instance in the philos-
ophy of cosmology.
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